1. G. B. KETCHAM:
On Wednesday, February 25, a pro and con debate was held in the Kiva room of Baldy Hall between Dr. Boris Albini, professor of microbiology at UB and chairman of the UB Animal Care Committee, and Donald Barnes, psychologist, former animal researcher and director of the National Anti-Vivisection Society.
   What follows here is a continuation of that discussion. A number of interesting points were raised at that debate that are worthy of further examination. We begin with Dr. Albini's observation that people quite naturally distinguish between human and animal species.
   Dr. Albini said that given a choice between eating a rat or eating our son, we automatically would choose to eat a rat. The point of his analogy was that it is natural for humans to place animals on a lower hierarchical rung of the ladder than humans. Dr. Albini simply states that this is naturally so. He does not proffer an explanation as to the reasons for this distinction.
   I want to approach this issue in such a way that we may examine the reasons for this conventional type of thinking, in order to bring it into the full light of day for further scrutiny. In that the effort here is to determine the rightfulness or wrongfulness of human conduct with regard to animals and experimentation, we must necessarily examine the bases for our justifications for this activity, without assuming that something is right simply because everybody is doing it. We are obliged to critique those reasons so that we do not presuppose the very issue that we are questioning.
   In Dr. Albini's corollary between rats and children we can clearly see that humans do differentiate. Another corollary may serve to expand on that point. Given the choice between eating your own son or someone else's, you would choose to eat someone else's son. Of course, this is not really an argument to justify the idea of eating another person's offspring, or for eating people in general . . . just as Dr. Albini's argument was not meant as a justification for eating animals.
   As rationally preoccupied beings, we humans relate to the world as though each individual self was at the center, as a kind of axle. We tend to view things as they relate to that individual self, e.g. for me, or against me. The largest categorical concentric circle that entails this "me" (self) is the Genus-species circle Homo sapiens. Homo-- means the Genus of primate mammals of which we are but one kind. Sapiens-- means that intellect, reason separates us from the other primate mammals, as unique among them. This uniqueness, this differences has somehow, mysteriously come to be translated as meaning of superior value or worth. What benefits Homo sapiens as a whole, can be construed as benefiting me as an individual. That which is considered detrimental to the needs and desires of Homo sapiens is logically interpreted as being detrimental to me as an individual self.
   Now there are those, like Mahatma Gandhi, who believe that we must go out to a greater categorical circle to include all animate beings as LIFE, as sacred, as Sanctum et Summa-Anima..."Sacred and Highest-LIFE." This sentient category particularly acknowledges those animals beings with complex central nervous systems that enable them to experience pain and suffering. It embraces those creatures who are now excluded from the total sphere of compassion enjoyed fully by humans.
   This argument is much like the exhortation that the human individual must widen the scope of his concern to include his family; or the exhortation that the individual should embrace all fellow human beings within the sphere of concern. He is urged not to bury his head in the sand. In this, we are saying that the full sphere of compassion must not be smaller than the sphere of suffering. To this extent there must be equanimity.

KETCHAM Con't.
   We make these species distinctions, in large part, according to two factors: a) commonality; b) convenience or utility.
   We may not feel we have much in common with a Downs Syndrome person, or a schizophrenic, but we do acknowledge a biological link in terms of direct, hereditary descendance. We call this "species distinction." This gets us into some difficulties when we start going back far enough that we start finding some possible ape connection in our virgin lineage.
   Of course, there is a very common parallel to this biological sort of distinction preoccupation . . . i.e. that of the family oriented self-centric who believes that the ONLY legitimate concern for him is his family. It's that "Godfather" type of thinking - isolationism, protectionism. It is that "Hatfields and the McCoys" kind of scenario. Blood-kin stick together, the rest are on their own.
   It is my contention that this "species distinction" is not a legitimate line of demarcation with regard to experimentation; and as a biological categorical distinction, it is irrelevant with regard to experimentation.
   Dr. Albini, in a recent debate, acknowledged that animals have sentience and in virtue of this, we are obliged to treat them with care and concern to some extent.
   I want to suggest that this commonality (in other words, sentience) between human beings and animal beings is the prima facie standard, and the crucial factor that reduces the "species distinction" operative to an illegitimate status. If sentience was not the central issue, and the potential for suffering was not central to the issue, there would be no controversy because we could just experiment on people. With no potential for suffering, experimentation would not be the object of human avoidance.
   I, therefore, speak for those who cannot; and I speak of a greater whole of which we, and animals, are both parts . . . as brothers and sisters who experience the nature of suffering. Let the criteria that applies to human beings apply to animal beings as when we start shanghaiing "volunteers" for our experimental projects.
   If I said that "any pain I can experience is worse than any pain you can experience," you would think I am an insensitive, self-centered bigot. In the same way, we should not rationalize this matter to a convenient conclusion that humans, in virtue of their intellect, suffer more than their animal counterparts from experimentation.
   It is LIFE, itself, that has immeasurable able value. And all sentient beings that abhor suffering in that LIFE...equally.
   If   the  evolution of mankind
is toward a higher consciousness, as we believe it to be, then let us NOW have the foresight and the insight to realize this inevitable, inescapable truth; that, as Albert Schweitzer said, ". . . all Being is life, and in loving self-devotion to other life we realize our spiritual union with infinite being."
   Let us, for once in human history, have the courage and the honesty to participate in the future by accepting the responsibility for our actions. Since  there  is nothing
that prevents us from comprehending this NOW we are culpable NOW.
   Let us not leave to future generations, the difficult task of trying to explain how this inhumanity to our fellow creatures could have occurred in a civilized society . . . even if the intentions were good.
   Our sensibilities mandate that animals have certain inalienable rights to be free from such exploitation as that which causes predictable suffering. Let the same criteria, concern, and compassion be applied to animals, that we apply to humans.

power of reasoning. This indicates that distinctions among living beings indeed can be made; and some of the distinctions seem to relate to ethical judgments about these living beings.
   And now let us see how we can apply these thoughts to Mr. Ketcham's statement "It is life, itself, that has immeasurable value." If "immeasurable value" paraphrases the other statement ". . . life, . . . sacred," and if we use the definition of life as biosphere, then we must continue the argument somewhat as follows. Since life is sacred, i.e., absolutely untouchable, and in its sanctity uniform and indivisible, life cannot inflict - that is, in an ethically acceptable manner - suffering or destruction to living beings. We cannot use life forms as nutrients, and these include plants, obviously, besides possibly already dead "life forms." We cannot destroy another life form, even when our own life is endangered by this life form, e.g., a tiger attacking you in the jungle, or, more likely, an infectious agent making you sick, possibly leading to death. Should we accept life as such sacred, i.e., the absolutely highest, ethical value, as absolute prescription, then the only consistent logical conclusion is that life has to commit suicide to comply with the ethical prescription of the absolute sanctity of itself. We, as many other beings, are heterotroph, and depend on the use of compounds incorporated in other living beings: lettuce, corn, chicken, and oxen; at least at the moment, it seems difficult to break this dependency. In addition, life itself, as going on without any participation of humans, very much involves destruction of life forms by other life forms, without much regard to suffering. To me, the absolutist approach seems of little appeal. First, I do not think that a majority of humans considers suicide a practical and in any form constructive response to problems in life. Second, one could argue that this ethical rule on life is not consistent with life itself, since "nature," i.e., life excluding humans, indeed includes destruction of life by life. And third, philosophically most importantly, destruction of life because of its sanctity and inviolability, rather seems paradoxical.
   Should we prefer to use the term "life" only for sentient living beings, we encounter two problems. First, by using "life" in this sense, we already acknowledge that life forms can be graded, i.e., a distinction made among them with relation to ethical issues. This means, we have somewhat followed what Mr. Ketcham calls "Godfather"-type thinking (and that it arises from anthropocentric approaches seems evident: we are sentient, therefore other sentient living forms, but not others, should be included in the same ethical category in which we place ourselves). Second, as to the practicality of such a definition, it seems quite doubtful that we know enough to define convincingly on the one hand what sentient means and on the other, whether and how sentient a specific life form is.
    I would accept the absolutist approach regarding life possibly as an extrapolation, as an ideal towards which we should attempt to move - obviously in the knowledge that we will not reach it in the real world: a navigator on high se sailing towards a star on the horizon, knowing very well that it is not the star where the harbor lies. In ethical practice applied to animal research, it seems to me that we have to treat life in all its forms with respect and consideration; at the same time, we have to consider and respect the differences that exit between various life forms.

Consideration of cruelty to animals. It seems difficult to escape anthropocentrism, in some ways speciesist motives even when we are outraged at cruelty committed against animals. Often, the b\substance of cruelty is found in the suffering of the victim. Whereas this seemed quite reasonable as an important principle defining cruelty, it should not be forgotten that cruelty may be seen, as pointed out in a recent seminar by Dr. Richard Hull, Department of Philosophy of this University, as primarily depending on the conscience of the observer. It seems indeed that a specific treatment of an animal may be unacceptable to our conscience even though the victim may not suffer obviously. The traumatization, the victimization is inflicted in this case directly on our conscience. Such considerations obviously require further analysis; but they show us the complexity of issues related to animal research, and especially, the constant presence of anthropomorphic approaches in anything we do.

Necessity for animal research. Often animal research is criticized as being unnecessary and unproductive, of only dubious value to humanity. It seems that such views rely

more on emotion and feelings, misinformation or ignorance than researched studies and documentation. The evidence for the tremendous benefits that animal research has had for the quality of life - including also that of non-human animals - has been compiled in other publications, most impressively, in my opinion, in an article written by Dr. John Krasny from the Department of Physiology of this university and published in the Buffalo Physician (reprinted in the Reporter). Not only has the most impressive advancement of biological science and medicine coincided with the fastest expansion of animal research, but the shaping of a basis for future developments in biological sciences and medicine seems impossible without inclusion of animals in experimentation.
    However, it is indeed true that the definition of "necessity" for a specific set of experiments often is difficult. Scientific research, i.e., explorations of the unknown, is not easily predictable. Thus attempts to determine the necessity of proposed experiments are difficult, which is well known to every researcher and every member of institutional committees concerned with animal research. There, as with most applied ethics, the best guarantee for optimal results seems the integrity of the researcher and committee member, and the multiplicity of the reviews applied.
Scientists and the control of animal research. Scientists involved in animal research are portrayed by some animal activists as pitiless and ethically unconcerned. Now, there is no profession without its black sheep. But just consider two facts. The goal or final objective of any medical and much biological research is the improvement and betterment of life; obviously, most people participate in this research because they share these goals. And then: scientists did organize associations for the humane care of animals already some hundred years ago, and without much outside pressure.
     Sometimes, it is said that animal research is formally not well controlled or not controlled at all. Such statements again either arise from ignorance or demagogy. Animal research is tightly regulated by the state and federal governments, agencies providing financial support for animal experiments,  professional associations, universities, and other research institutions. Should anybody be interested in a list of laws and regulations governing animal research, I will do my best to provide him with it. It seems to me that animal research indeed is regulated more tightly than most other human activities involving animals.
An attempt to propose a rational framework for the consideration of animal research. It seems important to realize that issues of animal research cannot be seen in a simplistic way, pitching "unnecessary" suffering of animals against a monolithic block of the animal's right. I propose that animals do not have the one and only right "not to suffer" or "not to be used in research," but have a variety of rights that sometimes are contradictory. The rights that have to be considered with regard to animal experimentation seem to be two: 1. The animal's right to be respected as a form of life, and thus the imperative to minimize suffering and prolong existence; and 2. The animal's right for improvement of the qualities of life, including prominently better health care and management of the living conditions. These two rights have to be balanced against each other when considering animal research to achieve the optimum in life quality. Abolition of animal research would harm humans and other animals as much as wild, unconcerned, and unregulated use or abuse of animals. Recognition of this point makes compromise necessary and aims at balance rather than at absolute "right or wrong." This is cumbersome, requires constant and continuous thinking and rethinking and the courage to make decisions, even knowing that they may not always be the right ones. It also requires the acceptance of making these decisions in a field of tension, and living with contradictions. But much of life, possibly all of it, seems, as suggested by Miguel de Unamuno in his work "The tragic sense of life," to be lived in such contradictions.
    In conclusion, it seems to be that life will profit most, both in ethical and biological parameters, if animal research will be viewed with increasing rationality and sophistication, thorough analysis and openness of mind, without loss of any human feelings and emotions. It is promising that we, at least in this community, seem to realize the necessity for extended, reasoned debate on the issues of animal research. As I have pointed out during my debate with Donald Barnes, extending the realm of our respect and concern to more and more beings is the natural goal of a humane society, However, reason must provide assurance that well meant enthusiasm does not unintentionally harm or destroy what it craves to improve and optimize.

Dr. Albini mistranslated my statement "Life . . . has immeasurable value" as meaning "life is . . . absolutely untouchable." "Immeasurable value" means NOT quantifiable as a vertical hierarchy of signification, i.e., greater or lesser worth. The differentiation that we make is lateral. My treatment of a carrot is different from my treatment of a dog; but this does not mean that a carrot has a greater or lesser value. The question is, "What is appropriate, each according to its own nature?" The nature of the carrot is such that it does not possess a complex nervous system; the nature of the carrot is such that after maturity it rots if not consumed; the nature of a carrot is such that its life is brief, and the end of its life roughly coincides with the harvesting of it. Can this be said of a dog"
   Dr Albini states, "life forms can be graded." This implies a vertical hierarchy of signification. They can be differentiated, yes. But we habitually translate "different" as "unequal" This perennial error has produced a profuse amount of malevolent conduct throughout human history with regard to blacks, women, and "heretics," to name just a few examples. If sentience differs between a tapeworm, a monkey, and a human . . . then let us be guided by the nature of each existence, not a value hierarchy of signification. The question we want to keep before us is, "What is appropriate to each, according to its own nature?"
   When Dr. Albini states that ". . . research is tightly regulated . . ," one must realize that such regulation is predicated on the belief that Dr. Albini echoed when he said, "Animals do not have the one right 'not to suffer' . . . ." What usually is stated is that suffering is permissible to the extent that research requires it. But as Albini has already stated, this is often not predictable. Thus, even the notion of "necessity" as a criterion is rendered meaningless. So now we have a situation where suffering is permissible even where no known necessity exists. Once the premise is made that animals do not have the right "not to suffer," we can readily deduce what logically follows:; for one, it renders the sentience issue "irrelevant"; if it's irrelevant, what's left that IS pertinent" NOTHING! This is the crux of the problem. This premise lurks beneath all subsequent research activity.
   I would not portray the scientist" as "pitiless." Rather, I would suggest that he has subordinated his compassion as if it was an unreliable, whimsical, inferior means of apprehending "truth." Unbridled rationality, left to its own designs as a sorting, stipulative, categorizing, comparing/contrasting, mechanical, quantitative operation, is capable of tremendous malevolence when granted dictatorial license, with absolute veto power, as the executive, legislative, and judicial head of the decision-making process. Compassion emphatically and unequivocally is NOT an emotion; it is part of the "checks and balances" that keep reason "in bounds." It does not submit to value hierarchies of signification. We have defied and sanctified rationality, while cultivating a mistrust of compassion.

Historically, compassionate insight into the wrongfulness of human conduct has always preceded the rational confirmation, e.g., racial and sexual discrimination. Compassion has its own legitimacy in human affairs. It is reason that must serve compassion, not the other way around. It regards each existence, according to its own nature. It is NOT an emotion.
   In terms of the notion that suffering, to some extent, is in the eye of the beholder . . . let us remember one thing: the vicarious sharing of the experience of suffering, in ANY case, does not approximate the suffering of the actual victim. The question here is whether this fact constitutes valid grounds for abandoning compassion, or for impugning its legitimacy. The observer does, in fact, apprehend the fear and confusion of a conscious being that is rendered in that dilemma. And we have the question, what are the consequences of applying this rationalization to humans? How far are we prepared to paint ourselves into a "solipsist" corner? Would it not be a greater imperative for us to direct our concerns to those observers who CANNOT empathize with regard to suffering, when it is known to exist?
   Dr. Albini tells us that suffering in animals is still extremely poorly understood. There is an anecdote to this predicament written by Mark Twain in which he said, "Some people are bothered by those things they read in the scriptures that they don't understand; what bothers me," he wrote, "are those things that I do understand." As Albini has already said, for all that we don't know, let us at least proceed in accordance with what we do know. One thing we do know is that if we step on a dog's paw he yelps with pain; if we put chemicals in a rabbit's eye, he suffers; and when we do pain research on animals, we already know what's going on. We are not now treating animals, each according to its nature; nor are we treating them according to our current knowledge of suffering; nor are we restricting research to what is known to be necessary.
   Space does not allow me to address any more of Dr. Albini's thoughtful and challenging points of issue. I have a great deal of respect for his openness and willingness to participate in this illuminating dialogue. I would like to encourage the Reporter and the animal care committee to allow this discussion to continue next fall. I believe it is essential for cultivating a true understanding of what the implications are here; only through a protracted exchange of ideas can we reconcile many misunderstandings and ambiguities. I believe Dr. Albini sagaciously articulated the predicament that all of us are in when he said that we must be prepared to "rethink" to re-examine our human activity and the rationale that produces it. The answers we uncover may be painful or inconvenient, but I believe that this society possesses the courage and the sincerity necessary to penetrate any reluctance to reconcile these thorny issues.
   I thank Dr. Albini for his willingness to become involved; and I shall look forward to participating in this meaningful dialogue in the future.