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The Alchemy of Informed Consent

Richard T. Hull

Carl Schneider’s extraordinarily nuanced and sensitive study of autonomy is a needed and welcome elaboration of the myriad empirical reasons why the sacred bioethical cow has given sour milk and rancid butter over the years.1 The case he makes for why patients are resistant to assuming the burdens of their own medical decision making is compelling, both in its psychological sophistication and in its exposure of the off-putting and discouraging characteristics of medical bureaucracy and physicians’ habits. And his proposal for a return to the rules of civil intercourse on the part of physicians is most welcome and not to be disputed. If widely implemented, these rules should substantially improve the atmosphere of relations between patients and physicians. So, what, if anything, is to be said about his diagnoses and prescriptions, other than "Right on!"?

Schneider’s book is, from one perspective, curiously incomplete. He details the wishes and interests of patients in all their rich variety. He honestly and fairly characterizes the benefits and disbenefits of the new organizations of medicine. But, he brushes off the plaints of physicians about patients’ suspicion and squeamishness as the natural outcome of those forces that impinge on the patient. To be fair and balanced, docs deserve a better representation in this court of bioethics.

In his rush to counter principlist tendencies in bioethics with situationally sensitive characterizations of the plights of patients, Schneider does not fully explore the full range of reasons for the principles of bioethics as regards the duties of patients in the context of medical decision making and of the moral needs of physicians. Schneider devotes less than a page to the latter subjects, and any full reconsideration of the relations between physicians and patients must, if it is to hope for success, address this dimension of the issues with equal sensitivity.

The space is not adequate here for me to provide such a complete set of considerations. Rather, I hope to establish that there is a legitimate set of further issues involved in patient responsibility to be considered by bioethics from the point of view of physicians. In what follows, I give an argument that appears to support something like mandatory autonomy. I am not sure who are I am not sure whether I personally would endorse it. Rather, I intend it as a foil to stimulate further exploration of the issues raised in Schneider’s work.

1. Physicians have a duty not to commit battery on their patients. This truism, part of the rationale for such rules as the requirement of informed consent for treatment, has long been recognized from the patient’s point of view. That is, since an unconsented touching is a battery under the law-apart from emergency situations where consent is presumed-physicians need their patients’ consent in order to ply their craft. Absent such consent, surgery becomes stabbing, chemotherapy becomes poisoning, and urological examinations become sexual assaults. Nor is the defense of good intentions a sufficient excusing factor. The law recognizes the consent of the patient as essential, and it does not excuse the provision of unwanted medical care by the benevolent intentions of the provider.

2. Therefore, physicians have a right not to commit a battery on their patients. Although this statement might sound odd, it follows directly from the duty mentioned in the first observation, together with the general moral principle that "ought implies can." Any individual having a duty to do something has a right to do it, in that such a right at least involves a right against others who might place obstacles in the way of satisfying that duty. For example, if a divorced father has a duty to visit with his child regularly, he has a right that the child be available for such visitations. Sometimes such rights imply obligations on the part of others not merely not to interfere but actually to provide material elements necessary to doing one’s duty. If I have a duty to repay an individual the $500 I borrowed, and I have sufficient funds in my bank account, I have a right to extract that money necessary to payoff my loan, and that right implies the obligation of my bank to assist in my withdrawal.

3. What keeps a physician’s touching of a patient from being a battery is the patient’s consent. We would no doubt want to qualify this claim for children and other persons who lack capacity, but the arrangements made in such cases are designed to have appropriate (not just any) decision makers act on behalf of persons who are incapable of competent self-determination. Generally, it is the consent for he patient that keeps as physician’s touching from crossing the line of battery and assault.

4. Therefore, physicians have a right to the consent of their patients to the acts that constitute physicians’ treatment. This is not an absolute right to consent; physicians are not some special class of individuals who practice by divine right. Rather, the practice of medicine is a privilege extended by the patient, and the extension of such privilege is normally through the consent of the patient or the patient’s representative or guardian. In the

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case of emergency treatment, where the patient’s life hangs in the balance and no advance directive is evident, consent is presumed for such time as the patient’s life is in the balance and no due representative of the patient can be consulted.

5. Therefore, patients have a duty to give consent to the acts that constitute their physicians’ treatments. I do not mean this duty to be construed as absolute. Cruzan has taught us that, in the public morality of this society, a patient may refuse treatment, even if it is life-sustaining, such refusal being finally determinative of the responsibilities and rights of involved physicians. Rather, when patients seek treatment by physicians, it is the consent of those patients to whatever treatment is provided that gives physicians what they need in order to avoid battering or assaulting their patients in providing that treatment.

We are at a critical juncture in the argument. For, it might seem that a patient can give a blanket consent to whatever the physician thinks best, and thereby shift the material burden of deciding on a treatment onto the physician. (Schneider contemplates such a practice and regards it rather benignly, noting that it is a common expression of patients’ wishes and acknowledging that physicians meet such a stance with mixed feelings, but offering no principled argument against allowing such a shift.)

Let us assume that it makes sense to say that a patient has consented to a treatment regimen, using language like "Whatever you think best, Doctor," even when the patient does not know what the doctor does think best in the situation. What, if anything, is authorized by such an act of speech?

I can envision three possible responses. (1) The patient might be said to have authorized anything the physician thinks best. In that case, nothing the physician does and "thinks best" would constitute a battery. The physician might sterilize the patient in thinking it best that the patient not have any more children, or the physician might remove a healthy kidney in thinking it best that another patient receive a transplanted organ. (2) The patient might be said to have authorized any standard medical procedure typically employed for patients with the particular problems this patient has. Under such a conception (which I suspect Schneider would countenance under his notion of "guidelines"), a naive or incautious Jehovah’s Witness would have unknowingly authorized a transfusion, and a patient who believes in certain versions of bodily resurrection might unknowingly consent to amputation and cremation of the amputated limb. (3) The patient who attempts to consent without knowledge has not really consented to anything at all.

The consequences of the first and second responses are unacceptable. The first response is wholly unacceptable on the face of it, and the second is unacceptable in a society characterized by an enormous diversity of beliefs about bodily matters as a rule of procedure when physician and patient do not come into the medical situation with fully consonant values and beliefs. That leaves us with the third response. And the consequence of the third response is this:

6. Patients who seek to give consent that is not knowing consent fail in their duty to their physicians. Consent must be informed.

For a long time, I thought that the upshot of this argument was a kind of negotiation that needs to go on between the patient who is reluctant to make substantive decisions about his or her care and the physician who is treating that patient. One might still argue that physicians, while they have the theoretical right to insist on their patient’s informed consent as a condition of treatment, routinely can and often should excuse patients from such an obligation. One could object that all I have shown is that patients have no right to waive informed consent and remain blissfully ignorant. Physicians may, and out of decency probably should, extend the privilege to give blanket, uninformed consent out of respect for patients’ squeamishness or their sense of being overwhelmed by their condition. After all, isn’t the treatment situation somewhat analogous to a contract? Each party brings his or her terms to the table, and if a set of those terms is found to be acceptable to everyone, the bargain is struck. And if a part of that bargain is the patient’s attitude of "Do whatever you think best, Doctor," and the physician is willing to assume the burden, where is the harm?

It has occurred to me, however, that physicians have another source of obligations in addition to the wishes of and agreements with their patients. Every physician takes, upon admission to the profession, the Hippocratic Oath. Although some elements of the oath have fallen by the wayside in recent decades, one has remained central: Above All, Do No Harm. As medicine is now recognized in what is effectively a social contract, it is still largely a self-regulating profession that enjoys the privileges of monopoly and high status in exchange for adhering to the standards it has set for itself and publicly proclaims.

It is an interesting historical fact that the doctrine of informed consent emerged as medicine moved from a relatively passive art in which achieving a correct diagnosis of the patient’s condition and prognosis of the patient’s likely medical future was the goal, to an admixture of art and science in which the causes of ill health are dealt with aggressively. The Hippocratic injunction, more fully "to help, or at least to do no harm," has perhaps never been more apt than in this time of chemotherapy, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, surgery, radiotherapy, and gene therapy.

What is it that keeps these invasions of our persons, our bodies, our minds, and our germ cells and somatic cells from being harms? Such invasions are harms if performed by enemy soldiers, criminals, or terrorists. They are harms even if performed by medical personnel if done so without the patient’s knowledge and consent, direct or through a proxy. It is the patient’s knowledgeable consent—his or her agreement to such
invasions—that transforms these invasions from harms into treatments, and that converts the resultant scars, deformities, and functional losses from injuries into unfortunate consequences. This is the alchemy of informed consent.

So, the final element in the case for informed consent being a patient’s duty to the physician is in place. Informed consent to treatment is needed by the physician and surgeon, needed as a crucial element in the preservation of the physician’s oath. The practice of modern medicine can avoid harm only with the informed, knowledgeable, freely given consent of the patient. Hence the final principle:

7. Physicians need informed consent if their practice is to remain consistent with the Hippocratic Oath. That need is not satisfied if either patients or physicians waive their respective rights regarding informed consent. Hence, physicians have an absolute duty to obtain informed consent to perform invasive procedures; patients have a duty, consistent with their capacities, either to give informed consent or to refuse treatment. They may not morally opt for blanket consent.

In correspondence, Carl Schneider has raised with me the fundamental question he raises in his book, that of the practicality of principlist ethics. “How capable are patients of meeting the standards you set for them? How capable are doctors [etc.] of helping them do so in any satisfactory way?” Behind his questions is a seemingly irrefutable argument against my position, an argument that turns on the dictum, “Ought implies Can.” If my requirements of patients and physicians cannot be met—that is, if neither “can” meet my requirements, then neither “ought” to meet them—the requirements are hollow and do not express duties at all. Is there any way to view such duty-claims other than in a way that they fall to the limitations of humans imbedded in their lives and struggles?

Ironically, Schneider has provided a direction in which to think about these difficulties. He suggests nearly a dozen courtesies that physicians would do well to adopt as measures that would ease the experiences of their patients and foster a better, less confrontational atmosphere in which the pursuit of healing can better occur. My suggestion is that Schneider’s task is incomplete until a similar list of courtesies is commended to the patient and the patient’s family. Such a list would be a step in the direction of countering bioethics’ position that informed consent is (only) a right of the patient against the physician. The suspicions besetting medicine call for a recognition that the obligations of the physician-patient relationship are not one-sided—that physicians have rights and patients have responsibilities, too—so that they may come together in recognition of duties owed to one another.

I suppose that my “requirements” should be taken as descriptive of the ideal. Are there any physicians who never do harm? I suspect that even pathologists cannot evade the charge. Ought they to do no harm? To say that they ought may not imply that they can, but rather that they should strive mightily to avoid harming their patients. Should patients be expected to meet these standards? Even if the patient is not able, there is something more noble about a patient who recognizes that to ask another to undertake the task of healing is to ask a great deal, and who struggles—despite relative ignorance, fear, pain, and despair—to give the physician the forgiveness of informed consent, than the patient who treats the physician as a servomechanism and simply commands, "Physician, heal myself!"

NOTES

